# Mechanism Design for Social Good

Provision and Targeting for Vulnerable Populations

EC 2020 Tutorial, July 13

Exercise Session

Sera Linardi

University of Pittsburgh

Sam Taggart

Oberlin College

# Setup

Goal of this exercise: Understand (visually) who is helped by in-kind transfers.


#### Two goods


- education g
- cash x


**Utilities**  $u(g,x) = a \log g + (1-a) \log x$ 


#### **Optimal consumption:**

- a fraction of wealth on education
- (1-α) fraction of wealth as cash










price p  $\alpha = .5$ education g

cash x


wealth W



price p education g  $\alpha = 2/3$ 


cash x

wealth W




education g

wealth W price p a = .25cash x




To find optimal consumption: Find where level curve exactly touches budget set.


## Part 1b




### Part 1c




## Part 1c



## Part 1d



## Part 1d



#### Punchline

In-kind provision can have a differential impact on recipient's consumption bundles.

=> In-kind provision can be a form of self-targeting.